This study proposes five kinds of game theoretic models of platform-type product service systems considering manufacturing viewpoints. Recently, manufacturing industries face a strong trend towards servicizing. One possible solution to manufacturer's servicizing is a fusional framework incorporating products and services. Such a fusional product service system is able to enhance product functionality and consumers' satisfaction by constructing appropriate formation of them. Along with this background, our preceding study presented categorization of actual business and three basic models, especially focusing on platform-type business like smart phones, online music stores and electronic books (Nishino et al. 2012 ). The current study presents an extension of the models and conducts its game-theoretic analysis. Constructing five kinds of platform-type product service system models, the present study derives the theoretical equilibrium of each model. Then we discuss the characteristics of each model and manufacturers' strategy in platform-type business.
Introduction
Manufacturing industries now confront several problems like severe price competition, shortening product lifecycle, and product commoditization. So manufacturers, as indicated with smiling curve phenomena, have difficulty in producing value simply by assembling production. In addition, customer s preferences are diversified and people s lifestyles have been changing. Against this background, manufacturers have a trend to shift to provision of a whole system including service aspects in order to increase product value. In this sense, the concept of Product Service Systems (PSS) is advocated by Goedkoop et al. [1] , which explains PSS Meantime, Industrial Product-Service Systems (IPS2) [2] is also studied by many researchers, which deals with dynamic interdependencies of products and services in production. For example, Rese et al. studied IPS2 using net present value approach and real options [3] . Meier et al. describes how to build IPS2 network considering capacity allocation in business models [4] . Richter et al. address flexibility in IPS2, especially considering customer-supplier relationships [5] . In addition, service engineering has been proposed and studied as well. For example, a service CAD system is developed by Arai and Shimomura [6, 7] . Moreover, Sakao et al. [8] apply the methodology of service engineering into accommodation service and renting of home appliances.
As a PSS, our study especially addresses on the platform-type PSS. Platform-type business structures have been recently emerging in several business scenes. For example, some smart phones adopt service provision with a platform, in which a lot of contents are available for smart phone users. This platform-type structure is considered important for manufacturers because physical products are essential in order to provide services on that platform. Therefore, we elucidate the mechanism of platform-type PSS structure.
In the field of business administration, related studies are conducted from a viewpoint of platform . For example, Cusumano and Gawer [9] describe platform leadership in business circumstances. Additionally, Evans et al. [10] explain that a software platform is invisible engines to be the source of great value to consumers. In the meanwhile, an economic theoretical -was studied by Richet et al. [11] , Armstrong [12] , Hagiu [13] , and others. These studies can be regarded as a sort of platform-type business model. They clarify the theoretical mechanism from the viewpoint of economics.
Our preceding research [14] investigated business models with platform strategies and categorized them into several types, especially considering manufacturing viewpoints. In the research, a basic model framework was proposed and three kinds of business structures were modeled. The model is comprised of service providers, manufacturers, and consumers, which interact one another on a common platform. The present study additionally proposes other two types of platform-type business structures. Summarizing the preceding models, our current study redefines them as five kinds of platform-type PSS models. Then, game theoretical analysis demonstrates characteristics, profitability, and product diffusion in comparison of the five models.
Game theoretic approach to PSS
Game theory is one of decision theory that was originally provided by von Neumann and Morgenstern [15] . In particular, the theory can treat interdependent relationship among decision-makers. Nash equilibrium is used as a basic solution concept, which is an equilibrium state where each player behaves rationally considering others actions. So, it means that the equilibrium is a state that any players do not have incentive to deviate. Although unrealistic assumptions such as perfect rationality and complete information are often assumed, the equilibrium concept by the game theoretic approach is very important because socio-economic systems are generally formed though interactions among stakeholders such as manufacturers, suppliers, and consumers who are basically economic entities to pursue profit maximization. Therefore, the equilibrium analysis can clarify possibility that the structure of PSS can be successful although it is not sure to attain the equilibrium in the real world.
The PSS studies we mentioned above do not consider game theoretic situations. However, the success of PSS is generally dependent on interactive behavior among device producers, service providers, and consumers. Therefore, it is worth considering a game theoretic situation of PSS. Our study addresses interactions among stakeholders in platform-type PSS using game theory.
3. The basic framework of platform-type service systems proposed by our preceding study As defined in the preceding study [14] Then, based on this definition, the basic framework was modeled in the study [14] . The model includes players of four kinds: content developers, the platform provider, the device manufacturer, and consumers. The content developers produce some content that constitutes service components which cannot work per se. In the model, each content developer develops different content from others and accordingly various kinds of service components are available. The device manufacturer produces some devices on which the contents work. The device is represented as a product component. The platform provider provides a sort of a platform which connects the device and the contents, and thereby the provider issues license to content developers and/or the device manufacturer. Fig. 1 depicts the overall view of each player s decision and product flow.
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Fundamental structure of each model
Fig . 2 presents the five models of the platform-type PSS we propose. Cases 1 to 3 have already been presented in [14] and Cases 4 and 5 are additionally presented in the current study.
In Case 1, the platform provider gives license both to content developers and the device manufacturer. The device manufacturer produces and sells devices. Since the manufacturer is licensed from the provider, the manufacturer must pay a license fee to the provider. Similarly, the licensed content developers sell their content to consumers and pay a fee to the provider. For example, business structure like Windows OS is applicable to this case.
In Case 2, the platform provider purchases the device from the manufacturer and sells the device to consumers; and the licensed content developer sells their content to consumers in the same way as Case 1. Mobile phone service in Japan like i-mode is applicable to this case.
In Case 3, content and platform are embedded into devices and products are completed as a total system by the device manufacturer. Ordinary home appliances are applicable to this case because they often incorporate an embedded system into the products.
In Case 4, the platform provider purchases the device and content from respective players and sells it as a product. Content developers and the device manufacturer just supply the content/device to the platform provider. Actually, this case is rarely seen in real business. However, this structure is worth considering its theoretical mechanism.
In Case 5, the device manufacturer has an initiative and sells products that have several contents which work on the platform. This case is similar to Case 3 but it is different in that the platform works and the manufacturer has to pay a license fee to the platform provider. Currently this case is also not so many in the real world because development of information communication technology now enables content developers and platform providers to construct online channels that sell content. However, this case is worthy to be treated in terms of considering manufacturer s strategy.
Description rule for formulation
Before presenting our model s formulation, we now define some parameters and the rule of the indices. j i P and j i w respectively signify the product price and wholesale price. Herein, i stands for the player who sets the price and j is the player whom player i offers: } , , , { , C cd pp dm j i , where dm, pp, cd, and C respectively represent the device manufacturer, platform provider, content developer, and consumers.
Device manufacturer
The device manufacturer produces and sells devices. The manufacturer must pay a license fee in case of licensing from the platform provider. respectively denote the variable cost and fixed cost for production.
Platform provider
The platform provider licenses other players. In cases 2 and 4, the platform provider directly sells devices to consumers by buying them from the device manufacturer. Especially in case 3, the provider sells to the device manufacturer the set of some contents and its platform as a total system to be embedded. In Cases 1 and 5, the provider gives license to content developers and the device manufacturer. The profit is formulated as follows. 
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Content developers
In our model, different developers are assumed to sell their own content. For simplicity, each content developer produces only one kind of content. As such, content developer i's profit is defined as follows. f is the fixed cost. We assume that they have no variable cost because content such as software can be duplicated easily at almost no expense.
Consumers
In Cases 1 and 2, a consumer purchases content and the device separately and thus consumer i's utility is ) (S v is the indirect network externality effect, which depends on the total number of contents provided by content developers S . In the formula, the first term means that reservation price is decreasing, depending on the ratio of the purchased number.
The idea of network externalities are generally defined as a positive externality that is increasing by the number of users who purchased the same product [16] .
In our model, such an effect is explained in the following: the spread of contents eventually leads a good selection of services and thereby the increasing number of contents can enlarge consumer s utility. In this sense, we use the term of indirect .
In the meantime, consumer i in Cases 3, 4 and 5 is defined as 4) (Case 5) and 3 (Cases ) ( ) (
where S signifies the quantity supplied by content developers implying the number of contents embedded into the products. If many contents are incorporated into the product, then the utility increases according to that number. 
Game theoretic analysis
Nash equilibrium
We obtain the following Nash equilibrium. Therein, * cd stands for the total surplus of all content developers:
. In addition, CS represents the . Therefore, the device manufacturer can increase profit by introducing the platform rather than ordinary embedded systems like Case 3. In the other hand, under 2 c k , the profit in Case 1 (Case 2) is less than that in Case 3. This means that, because k represents the network externality effect, the device manufacturer can make profit especially when consumers are in a situation where other many consumers purchase the same product and thereby consumers can easily get benefit from the network effect. Such relation is applicable for Cases 4 and 5 as well.
The platform provider s profit in Cases 1 and 2 is 2 * pp , and therefore the platform provider can obtain high profit independent of the parameter of k . It implies that the platform provider has an advantage in platform-type business. In the meanwhile, if k is small, the device manufacturer s profit might be negative. Rather the profit is larger in Cases 3, 4, and 5 than that in Cases 1 and 2. Only in a situation with large k , the device manufacturer can obtain high profit in Cases 1 and 2. This result indicates that, because platform-type business has been recently growing in the real world, manufacturers would have disadvantage compared with platform providers as long as the network externality effect is small. From the viewpoint of manufacturers, it is important for manufacturers to be a platform provider by taking an initiative to construct its platform.
Conclusion
This study extends the platform-type PSS model provided by our preceding study and totally presents five models having different business structures. Game theoretic analysis is conducted and obtained theoretical equilibrium states. The results demonstrate that it is important for manufacturers to take a platformconstructing strategy to survive in recent networked business environments.
